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: The Constitution Is Dead

THE CONSTITUTION IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE CONSTITUTION!
THE CREATION, ENDURANCE, AND MODIFICATION OF MODERN REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS*
Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós**


I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutions come and go. Some were born illegally, but still manage to gain legitimacy and
endure. Others observed the established processes of adoption yet floundered shortly after. This is so,
because the validity of a constitution is not wholly dependent on the legality of its creation. On the contrary,
how a constitution is created, why it endures, and how it changes depends on the legitimacy, and thus
authority, generated by the process of creation and the level of connection, and thus fidelity, the current
generation has with the content of the original constitutional project. There is also interdependency between
these stages of constitutional existence, since how a constitution is created will also impact its endurance
and future developments, including possible modifications. All of this is particularly true and relevant in
the context of revolutionary constitutions, both in terms of the processes that generated them and their
substantive content.
This article will analyze these stages of constitutional existencenamely: (1) creation; (2)
endurance; and (3) changeand how normative factors such as legality, legitimacy, authority, connection,
and fidelity impact each of them. It will also analyze the interaction between the stages among themselves
and how they impact one another. My main normative proposals are that: (1) highly democratic processes
of creation, even if illegal or extralegal, can generate sufficient legitimacy and authority so as to be accepted
by the community as valid; (2) revolutionary processes of constitutional creation that reflect and capture
the deeply-rooted preferences of the social majority will endure, so long as the original social consensus
holds; and (3) when a new process of constitutional creation takes place, the available avenues of
constitutional change will depend on the contrasting levels of legitimacy and social connection of the
original and new constitutional creation processes.
In particular, I propose that: (1) legitimacy and authority are the main normative factors relevant to
the validity of constitutional creation; (2) both legitimacy and authority, on the one hand, and connection
and fidelity on the other, will be almost equally crucial to constitutional endurance; and (3) that connection
and fidelity will be the deciding factors when engaging in constitutional change, linking up with the
legitimacy and authority of the process of change itself, particularly in the case of replacement. These
proposals require a normative model that discusses each individual interaction between stage and
conceptual factor, analyzes their interdependency, and proposes a more general explanation as to the critical
process of constitutional development that allows a particular society to establish, maintain, and modify its
constitutional structures.
As we will see, most of the answers to these questions are to be found in the realm of constitutional
politics and not in the technicalities of law. Because of the central role modern constitutions play in the
development of a particular political community, there is a critical intersection between politics and law
that increases when there is a particularly transcendental social process that requires or generates a legal
revolution.1
Constitutions are at the heart of any revolutionary change in law and politics, whether as an obstacle
to these transformative processes, as their main ally, or as their product. As such, there is nothing as counterrevolutionary as an old constitution on its way out, and nothing as revolutionary as a new constitution on
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its way in. How this process plays out requires a deeper look. In particular, we need to analyze how a
revolutionary process can impact the different levels of constitutional existence, specifically as to issues of
legitimacy, authority, connection, and fidelity between future social majorities and the one that originated
the current constitutional project in the first place.
This article is divided into the following parts. Part I is this introduction. Part II will focus on the
normative factors that impact the different stages of constitutional existence and their validity. In particular,
we will discuss concepts such as legality, legitimacy, authority, connection, and fidelity. Part III will offer
an analysis of the different stages of constitutional existence. In particular, we will discuss each stage
(creation, endurance, and change) separately, so as to learn their respective inner-workings, and we will
also analyze the impact each of the normative concepts discussed in Part II has on the different stages of
constitutional existence. Finally, we will discuss how each stage interacts with the other two. Part IV will
offer some final thoughts.
II.
NORMATIVE FACTORS



A. Introduction

In this Part we analyze the different normative factors that impact how a constitution is created,
why it endures, and how it changes in the future. Each factor will be applied to each particular stage in Part
III, and they are directly related to the issue of constitutional validity, in other words, the continued
acceptance of a constitutional process and order by a particular community.
The first set of factorslegality, illegality, and extra-legalitydeal with the relationship between
each stage of constitutional existence and established legal order and its relation with the legal processes
and structures used to create, maintain, and modify a constitution. Here, the formal-informal dichotomy is
also analyzed. The second set of factorslegitimacy and authoritydeal with the issue of validity and
social acceptance of a particular constitutional action, particularly creation and endurance. The final set of
factorsconnection and fidelitydeal with the level of social support of the substantive content of the
constitutional project.
B. Legality, Illegality, and Extra-Legality
Legality refers to the compatibility of a particular action, process, or rule with the existing legal
order. In particular, it refers to their compatibility with pre-established formal structures that are accepted
as the current legal system. Ideally, these structures are also the result of a legal exercise, tracing back to
some original source of legal authority, sometimes called the “rule of recognition.”2 Such a rule “helps us
to determine whether a given rule is indeed a valid law,”3 since it constitutes the “ultimate and supreme rule
because it itself is not subject to another test for its own validity nor draws its existence from another rule.”4
As most relevant here, Black’s Law Dictionary defines legality as “[t]he quality, state, or condition
of being allowed by law.”5 In turn, the condition of being allowed by law can be met either through an
express authorization or, in some instances, the absence of a direct prohibition.
In the constitutional realm, this concept is somewhat tricky, since the only source that can be used to analyze
the legality of a particular action is the constitution itself. In other words, the legality of a constitutional
action can only be analyzed through the structures and norms laid out in the constitution. But because an
accepted constitution is the quintessential example of a rule of recognition, the issue of legality will be
relative and, most important, context-specific. This is so because a new constitution, while it may be

2
3
4
5

Joseph D'Agostino, Law's Necessary Violence, 22 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 121, 184 (2017).
Norman P. Ho, Internationalizing and Historicizing Hart’s Theory of Law, 10 WASH. U. JURISP. REV. 183, 190 (2017).
See id.
Legality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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adopted illegally, will determine its own legal status if it is accepted as valid by the community. When this
happens, the previous illegality will be cured by the new legal order.
Illegality refers to situations of a direct violation of the structures and norms established in the
current legal system. In other words, it is a direct contradiction to, and thus incompatible with, the preestablished legal system. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, this term can be defined as “[a]n act that is
forbidden by law; the state of not being legally authorized; [t]he quality, state, or condition of being
unlawful.”6 As relevant here, illegality focuses primarily on actions and processes that are either expressly
prohibited by the legal system or sufficiently in tension with it as to be considered incompatible.
In the constitutional realm, this concept applies to actions that are in direct contravention to the
specific, and sometimes exclusive, processes and norms recognized by the constitution, particularly as to
its modification or replacement.7 Interestingly, what starts out as illegal can become legal through the
establishment of a new constitutional order that is accepted by the population, thus becoming its own rule
of recognition.
Extra-legality refers to those actions or processes that, while outside the formal structures and
norms of the existing legal order, are not necessarily in direct violation of, or in contradiction with, that
system. For its part, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as “[b]eyond the province of law.”8 Extralegality occupies a gray area between legality and illegality.
Admittedly, sometimes it’s difficult to distinguish illegality from extra-legality. In some instances,
what starts as apparently illegal may become extra-legal.9 For now, the main distinguishing factor is that
while illegality is characterized as a direct violation of formal law, extra-legality operates outside what is
either permitted or prohibited. In relative terms, however, it is safe to state that extra-legality is closer to
illegality than to legality.
This trichotomy is related to the formal-informal dichotomy used by other scholars,10 particularly
in the context of constitutional change, but that can also be used when analyzing constitutional creation. In
the context of change, Marshfield explains that informal change “happens when binding constitutional rules
are modified without any corresponding alteration of the constitutional text.”11 As such, formal change
requires an actual modification of the content of the constitution itself. But the informal-formal dichotomy
is not limited to issues of change. For example, it can be applied to the creation stage. Formality is mostly,
though not inherently, related to legality; while informality can have both illegal and extra-legal
characteristics.


C. Legitimacy and Authority

Legitimacy is a normative concept that stems from the public’s approval of a particular process.12
Authority is produced when that approval generates general acceptance and recognition of its validity.13 In
that sense, legitimacy creates authority. Both allow a community to accept a constitutional process, and its
resulting content and operation, as valid.


Illegality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Peter Paczolay, Constitutional Transitional and Legal Continuity, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 559, 562-63 (1993).
8
Extra-legal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
9
Philip K. Y. Lau, Revolutionary Disobedience, 22 BARRY L. REV. 199, 247-48 (2017).
10
See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Respecting the Mystery of Constitutional Change, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2017); Carlos Bernal,
Foreword-Informal Constitutional Change: A Critical Introduction and Appraisal, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2014).
11
Marshfield, supra note 10, at 1058.
12
Or Bassok, The Supreme Court's New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 185 (2013).
13
Id.
6
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For purposes of this article, legitimacy and authority will mostly emerge from process,14
particularly as it relates to creation.15 In that sense, in terms of the different stages of constitutional
existence, legitimacy and authority will play a greater role in creation, share the spotlight with connection
and fidelity in terms of endurance, and perform a smaller role in terms of constitutional change. Of course,
the legitimacy and authority of the process of change, particularly when dealing with replacement, can be
seen as the start of a new process of constitutional creation, thus completing the circle.
Legality does not inherently relate to, or even necessarily generate, legitimacy.16 A perfectly legal
process can be characterized as illegitimate if the legal system itself has become suspect and its popular
support has evaporated.17 At the same time, a completely illegal process can receive sufficient popular
acceptance so as to be accepted and seen as legitimate.18 In that sense, popular approval can legitimize an
“otherwise illegal” act.19


D. Connection and Fidelity

By connection, I refer to the level of substantive agreement between the current social majority and
the content of the original constitutional project—more to the point, whether the policy views of the current
generation resemble the policy preferences that the constitutional generation entrenched. Whether it is
because the constitution (1) adequately reflected the policy preferences of the social majority, and those
preferences endure; or (2) managed to influence and persuade future generations into accepting the policy
preferences entrenched in the constitution as substantively desirable, then this creates sufficient connection
so as to allow the constitutional project to endure with the support of the current social majority.
Fidelity is the result of connection, and it refers to the level of allegiance that the current generation
has with the basic content of the constitution, the constitution’s continued status as authoritative, and the
current generation’s willingness to obey it and defend it from any potential attack. The ultimate
manifestation of connection and fidelity is veneration.20


1.

III.

STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL EXISTENCE & THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE FACTORS

A. Creation
Introduction

Creation is, almost by definition, the critical stage of constitutional existence. Without birth, there
can be no endurance, let alone growth. But more importantly, it is during constitutional creation that the
quest for legitimacy becomes strongest, particularly when the previous legal order resists the change and


For a different view as to a possible source of legitimacy, see Joel Colón-Ríos, The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power,
Democracy, and the Limits of Constitutional Reform, 48 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 199 (2010).
15
There are, of course, other sources of legitimacy and authority other than process. Our focus on process is one of emphasis. See AYSE
KADAYIFCI-ORELLANA, ISLAMIC NARRATIVES ON PEACE AND WAR IN PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 5 (2007).
16
See Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535, 583 (1995)
(referencing the spectrum of legitimacy and legality).
17
Bassok, supra note 12, at 187.
18
Id.
19
Lau, supra note 9, at 225. See also Richard Albert, Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and Their Democratic Foundations, 50
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 169, 175-76 (2017) [hereinafter Unconstitutional Constitutions] (discussing the illegality of the formation of the United
States Constitutions when breaking from the Articles of Confederation).
20
Ozan O. Varol, Constitutional Stickiness, 49 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 899, 907 (2016).
14
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the new order can be characterized as illegal or extralegal. The legitimacy of the process that creates the
constitution will be crucial to the issue of whether it is accepted as valid by the political community.21
As we will see, it is here where legality clashes with legitimacy more directly. In the end, a
successful creation process will generate its own legality. For now, the critical element is to recognize the
normative and analytical challenges produced by the start of a formal process of constitutional adoption.
This is what Arato calls “the problem of the beginning.”22 In other words, a constitution’s immediate fate
will depend on its survival of the birth process and its acceptance as valid by the community.23
As such, process will be key to acquiring legitimacy and authority, thus allowing the new
constitution to establish a new legal order. When this happens, the constitution’s creation becomes the
ultimate source of the new legality, generating a fictional, but accepted, origin story that can endure in the
future and resist future calls for its early demise. When the creation process is seen as legitimate and
authoritative, then the new constitution will be characterized as valid, thus ushering in a new constitutional
order that will serve as the core of the resulting legal system.
2.


Constitutional Politics vs. Ordinary Politics

In order to understand how constitutional creation processes can attain legitimacy and authority,
we must analyze the important differences between the exercise of constitutional politics as opposed to
engaging in ordinary politics. This distinction is critical in the particular context of revolutionary
constitutional creation processes that represent a challenge to the existing legal order.
Blount, Elkins, and Ginsburg explain, “[n]early all the normative and positive work on
constitutions proceeds from the assumption that constitutional politics are fundamentally different in
character from ordinary politics.”24 And not only are these types of politics different, constitutional politics
are seen to have, almost inherently, superior normative force.25 This is particularly so when the exercise of
constitutional politics, unlike ordinary politics, manages to adequately reflect the popular will and the policy
preferences of the social majority.26 This is strengthened when the exercise of constitutional politics is
carried out through highly democratic and popular processes and structures.27 This combination of
democratic process and substantive alignment creates an irresistible normative force.28 When this happens,
the actual legality of the process, as measured by the previous legal system, becomes mostly irrelevant.29
Of course, constitutional politics need not always generate a formal constitution. In fact, as we will
see, the exercise of constitutional politics can also be informal and be used in different stages and instances.
But one of the main articulations of constitutional politics is, undoubtedly, the formal adoption of a new
constitution.30 In this article, I focus mostly on the exercise of constitutional politics that results in the formal
adoption of a new constitution.
Curiously enough, we can also imagine a community adopting a “constitution” through a process
that resembles ordinary politics instead of constitutional politics. But, as we will see, “constitutions” that
are the result of ordinary politics lack authority and most likely will not endure or at least will be subject to

Another source of validity, as we will see, is the public’s agreement with the substantive content of the new constitution. I believe that
process legitimacy provides a stronger normative base for authority. See Andrew Kilberg, We the People: The Original Meaning of Popular
Sovereignty, 100 VA. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2014).
22
Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191, 194 (1995).
23
Kilberg, supra note 21.
24
Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 42, (Tom Ginsburg eds., Cambridge University Press 2012).
25
Id.
26
Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40.
27
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 42.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
David M. Mednicoff, A Tale of Three Constitutions: Common Drives and Diverse Outcomes in Post-2010 Arab Legal Politics, 28
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 215, 243 (2014).
21
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constant modifications through the future exercise of constitutional, or even ordinary politics. This reflects
the critical link between constitutional politics on the one hand, and legitimacy and authority on the other.
This is so because constitutional politics is not about form but is instead about process and content.
More importantly, it’s about the democratic engagement of the People in an exercise of direct selfgovernment. In that sense, for example, a single-issue national referendum about an important subject can
be considered an exercise in constitutional politics, while adopting a constitution without popular
participation or democratic authorization can be considered to be outside of constitutional politics. The
normative power of a constitution is dependent on whether its adoption was the exercise of constitutional
politics as opposed to ordinary politics.
Of course, constitutional politics tend to be rare or extraordinary, although there could be periods
of heightened democratic activity that stretch through a considerable time period.31 Revolutionary situations
are a prime example of this.32 As a result, constitutional politics “should be permitted to determine the
nation’s life only during rare periods of heightened political consciousness.”33 In that sense, ordinary
politics are what happen between extraordinary periods when constitutional politics are exercised.
When the exercise of constitutional politics actually results in the adoption of a new constitution,
then the normative effects of that exercise can remain well after the exercise is over and, as we will see,
will probably even endure until a new exercise of constitutional politics requires a course correction.34 In
that sense, ordinary politics will be exercised within the framework established by the constitution that
resulted from the exercise of constitutional politics.
In particular, we will also see how a constitution that is formally adopted as an exercise of
constitutional politics by way of a highly democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially
transcendental process of creation has the strongest normative case as to legitimacy and authority,
independent of legality.35 A constitution created by this type of process will, in turn, have a better chance
to endure and will require a similar exercise to change it.36
For now, the main point is to recognize the important distinction between ordinary politics and
constitutional politics. While this distinction will be relevant to all stages of constitutional existence, it
seems beneficial to include this analysis at the creation stage. How a constitution is created, and whether it
is the result of a legitimate exercise of constitutional politics, will impact its entire lifespan. The type of
constitutional project I wish to focus on in this article is premised precisely on the exercise of constitutional
politics from the very beginning. Revolutionary constitutions tend to be adopted through an illegal or
extralegal process of creation, so their legitimacy will depend on the level of legitimacy and authority
generated by the democratic exercise of constitutional politics.37 In other words, when a constitution is
created illegally or extra-legally it will be crucial, in order to achieve legitimacy and authority and thus be
regarded as valid by the community, that it was adopted through the exercise of constitutional politics;38 In
particular, if that exercise can be characterized as democratic and socially transcendental.

3.
Formal Adoption

Colon-Rios, supra note 14, at 17-18.
Id.
33
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1012, 1022 (1984).
34
When this happens, “[a] constitutional majority need not be an eternal political one; it is entitled to lose a few elections now and then.
The crucial question lies elsewhere: if the majority that adopted the constitution is actually a constitutional one or merely a temporary political
one that simply coincided with the constitution-making process”. Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 47. I will return to this issue when discussing
constitutional endurance.
35
See generally Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Justin Blount, The Citizen as Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional
Approval, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 361 (2008). See also Blount et al., supra note 24; Arato, supra note 22; Farinacci- Fernós, supra note 1.
36
Blount et al., supra note 24, 50-53. See also Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 362.
37
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 40 n.5. See also Lau, supra note 9, at 44-45.
38
Lau, supra note 9, at 216.
31
32
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The exercise of constitutional politics can come in many shapes and sizes, many of them informal,
and be present in different stages of constitutional existence.39 But when it comes to actual constitutional
creation, as the first stage of that existence, we must focus on processes of creation that actually culminate
with the formal adoption of a new constitution. The same applies at the very end of a constitution’s existence
when it is replaced by a new one. Here, the final stage ends with the beginning of a new cycle of
constitutional existence, with all the normative implications that entails, particularly in light of the model
discussed in this article.40
In other words, while this model allows for exercises of constitutional politics that do not
necessarily result in the formal adoption of a new constitution, in order to have a complete analysis of
constitutional creation, endurance, and modification, we must focus our attention to processes that do result
in the adoption of a formal constitution.41 By doing so, we are able to better test the normative validity of
the model and fully appreciate the full picture of constitutional existence from beginning to end and back
to a new beginning.
4.


Process of Creation and Revolutionary Constitutions

When a new constitution is created, the previous legal systemnormally structured through a
constitutionis replaced.42 This is particularly true in the context of revolutionary processes of
constitutional creation that result in the formal adoption of a new constitution, which can be characterized
as illegal or extralegal.43 As such, constitutional creation can be seen as the culmination of a process of
change and, simultaneously, as the start of a new one. In that sense, one constitution’s end is another’s
beginning.44
Constitutional creation has several moving parts.45 In order to have a complete picture of what this
entails, we must focus on both (1) issues of process and structure and (2) the political, historical, and social
forces that drive it. These two sets of factors interact in every stage of constitutional creation but are
particularly vital during the creation stage.46
In the particular context of the exercise of revolutionary constitutional politics, the creation process
begins even before the first drafter is selected or first word written.47 This is what Blount, Elkins, and
Ginsburg call the pre-drafting stage, which includes “the mobilization of interests (and counter interests)
prior to the preparation of a text.”48 When this happens, the formal framing process becomes the culmination
of a broader social phenomenon.49 As such, the actual framing process becomes inherently linked with the
pre-drafting stages, particularly as it relates to the social and historical forces that drove it.50 When the pre
See generally id.
See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819,
1835-43 (2016).
41
ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 53 (2009).
42
Vicky C. Jackson, What’s in a Name? Reflection on Timing, Naming, and Constitution-Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249, 1260
(2008).
43
There could be instances in which a revolutionary process decides to use legally available tools to establish a new constitutional order.
Historically, that has not been the case. But it is conceptually plausible that this may happen. See generally id. Cf. Blount et al., supra note 24.
44
This would complete the circle of constitutional existence, by which the normative elements used to analyze one constitution’s end
will coincide with the normative elements used to analyze its replacement’s beginning. See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 64.
45
“Constitution making is as ubiquitous as it is mysterious.” Blount et al., supra note 24, at 31.
46
See Blount et al., supra note 24, at 34. See generally Elkins et al., supra note 35.
47
Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 45.
48
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 34-35.
49
Id. at 35.
50
Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 46.
39
40
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drafting stage amasses legitimacy and authority, the framing and ratification stages benefit from it and
acquire even more normative force.51
In terms of the actual process and structure, this pre-drafting stage includes determinations related
to actors,52 timing, and the actual operation of the adoption mechanism itself.53 In terms of the role of the
relevant political, historical, and social forces, the pre-drafting stage will be critical.54 It is here that the
nature and orientation of the constitutional process will be decided.55
As Blount, Elkins, and Ginsburg propose, other stages of constitutional creation include drafting,
consultation, deliberation, adoption, and ratification.56 This includes the actual selection of the drafting
delegates, the operation of the deliberative body, and the roles the People will play during the entire
process.57 This can span from passive observation to active participation, including mandates to the
delegates, periodic consultation, sending direct proposals, and eventual popular ratification.58
The pre-drafting stage will be the critical moment where the process will be able to acquire
legitimacy and authority, particularly if it’s highly democratic, participatory, and popular.59 In revolutionary
contexts, the pre-drafting stage will be the direct result of the political force generated by the social
movement that brought about the revolutionary situation.60
5.


Clean Slate vs. Continuity

As Vicky Jackson suggests, “[c]onstitutions are written under a wide range of circumstances.”61 In
terms of their role in a particular community’s legal system, a constitution is either the first of its kind or it
replaces a previous one.62 And even when it is the first one adopted by a particular communitylike what
happens immediately after national independence, for exampleit rarely, if ever, means that there was no
previous governing source or device that the new constitution will replace.63 New constitutions always
replace something that came before them.64
As such, the adoption of a new constitution, in varying degrees, represents the end of a previous
legal order and the birth of a new one. This is so even when the new constitution is compatible with the
previous order and does not constitute a clean break with, or rejection of, the past system.65
Jackson identifies three types of circumstances in which a new constitution takes effect: (1) a clean
break from the previous order, which includes so-called constitutional moments;66 (2) a more incremental
process of constitutional change; and (3) transitional constitutions.67 For his part, Andrew Arato proposes
other circumstances in which constitutions are adopted, including gradual, legal, and extralegal processes.68

See Eugene D. Mazo, The Upstream Problem in Constitutionalism, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 795, 827-828 (2015) (proposing a
spectrum as to the different versions of constitutional creation).
52
Actors can be early-stage, later-stage, or exercise veto power. Blount et al., supra note 24, at 35.
53
Id. at 34.
54
Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 46.
55
Mazo, supra note 51, at 829.
56
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 34. Cf. Jennifer Widner, Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States Symposium: Constitution Writing
in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1522 (2008).
57
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 35.
58
See generally Blount et al., supra note 24.
59
See generally id. See also Widner, supra note 56.
60
Jackson, supra note 42, at 1258.
61
See id. at 1260.
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See generally Jackson, supra note 42. See also Lau, supra note 9, at 117.
65
Jackson, supra note 42, at 1265-67.
66
I will return to the issue of constitutional moments when addressing the change stage. For now, it’s worth pointing out that
constitutional moments are the exercise of constitutional politics that generate a change, however informal, to the current constitutional system.
For purposes of the creation stage, I will employ the broader term of constitutional politics. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1022.
67
Jackson, supra note 42, at 1260.
68
Arato, supra note 22, at 194.
51
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A clean break occurs when the new constitutional order totally replaces the previous one, including
the adoption of a new system of government and an alternative outlook as to the development of society.69
This type of clean break can be found in countries that have recently gained national independence or as
the result of a revolutionary process that topples the ancien régime of a particular society.70 In these
circumstances, the new constitution represents a rejection of the previous system and its that system’s
conscious replacement by a different one. Clean breaks are normally, though not inherently, done through
illegal or extralegal processes of creation.71 Once the existing legal order loses its authority and generates
the historical conditions for its replacement, the new order will not likely adhere to the previous one’s
structures for constitutional replacement.72
Another possibility is that the new constitution merely serves as an update that enhances and
develops, but does not structurally change, the previous legal order.73 In these instances, there is an
unbroken chain between both constitutions. While a new constitution may be adopted, a new system is
not.74 As such, this type of replacement does not constitute a paradigm shift and will most likely be done
through legally recognized channels.75 While it is possible that more informal or extralegal mechanisms are
also used, this type of constitutional creation is done within the existing legality.76
In terms of the main normative proposal of this article, I will focus mostly on constitutions that
represent a clean break from the previous system, particularly those that were created by an extralegal or
illegal revolutionary process. Precisely because they are clean breaks, these constitutions tend to be created
outside the legally recognized channels of constitutional change or adoption.77 Revolutionary constitutions
are hardly ever the result of legality.78 But, as we’ve seen, they almost always are the result of a process
that generates enough legitimacy and authority to trump its illegal or extralegal nature.79 Blount, Elkins,
and Ginsburg’s reference to constitutions that are created in moments of crisis is applicable here.80 This
also applies in the context of revolutionary processes that result in the formal adoption of a new
constitution.81
6.


Normative Factors

i.

Legality vs. Legitimacy of Process as the Main Source of Authority

As we saw, legality does not equal legitimacy.82 And illegality does not automatically entail
illegitimacy.83 In that sense, the link between legality and legitimacy is incidental, not inherent.
First of all, if the current legal order is eroded, weakened, or outright challenged, legality becomes
irrelevant.84 In these circumstances, not only does legality stop generating legitimacy, it can actually

Jackson, supra note 42, at 1260.
See id.
71
Lau, supra note 9, at 248 (“Revolutionary disobedience creates a constitutional moment by first breaking into illegality, by means of
which it defines the higher law of the land”).
72
See id. at 226. See also Widner, supra note 56, at 1521.
73
Jackson, supra note 42, at 1265-67.
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
Lau, supra note 9, at 248-49.
78
See id. at 248.
79
Lau, supra note 9, at 248.
80
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 39, 42 (“[C]onstitutions are typically adopted during moments of crisis, and so likely to produce more
attention to the general welfare and less likely to be dominated by special interests”). See also Lau, supra note 9, at 220.
81
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 40.
82
Lau, supra note 9, at 213.
83
See id. at 213, 248.
84
See id. at 226.
69
70
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generate illegitimacy.85 In other words, there are situations where following the rules of a dying legal order
can actually be perceived as undemocratic and illegitimate by the public.86 By the same token, ignoring
those rules can actually command popular support and approval.87
However, I must concede that if the current legal order still commands sufficient public acceptance,
then legality can bolster the case for legitimacy and illegality can breed illegitimacy.88 But that is a relative
situation. It merely means that, in these circumstances, legality can generate some legitimacy.89 But that
reality can be overridden by the superior normative force that can be generated by an illegal or extralegal
exercise of constitutional politics.90 In other words, the more legitimacy the current legal order has
(legality), the stronger the normative force of the illegal or extralegal process needs to be.91
As such, legality, even when it can generate some legitimacy, is not legitimacy’s main source. On
the contrary, I propose that the main, though not exclusive, source of legitimacy as to the adoption of a new
constitutional order is the nature of the process that generates that new constitutional order.92 In particular,
I propose that a revolutionary constitutional adoption process (that can be characterized as democratic,
public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental) starts out with almost irresistible legitimizing
force. This is so, because “[p]ublic involvement in constitutional making is increasingly considered to be
essential for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process.”93
In other words, when the People exercise constitutional politics through a democratic, public,
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental process of creation, legitimacy almost necessarily
follows.94 This type of adoption process constitutes the strongest version as to the exercise of constitutional
politics that will command the greatest public support and acceptance, precisely because of the nature of
popular involvement in the creation process.95
And this will be independent of whether that process was legal, extralegal, or even illegal.96 If a
new constitution is generated by a process that is accepted by the public, then it becomes legal.97 When a
new constitutional order is adopted by a self-governing people, a new legality is born.98
As a result, we can conclude that: (1) legitimacy is the most important factor of constitutional
creation; (2) the process of creation can be a crucial source of legitimacy; and (3) democratic, public,
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental processes have the strongest case for legitimacy and,
thus, authority. In that sense, authority is the result of legitimacy and not legality. This authority allows the
new constitution to be accepted as valid by the political community and for a new constitutional order to
begin.


See id. at 247.
See id. at 213.
87
See id. at 248.
88
See id. at 210, 214.
89
See id. at 213.
90
See id. at 226.
91
See id. at 226, 247.
92
Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 756 (2011) (proposing that “authority depends on perception.”).
93
See generally Elkins et al., supra note 35. See also Blount et al., supra note 24, at 50 (“The loss of design consistency may be offset
by resultant gains in legitimacy”). Yet, the same authors suggest caution (“The claim that participatory design processes generate constitutions
with higher levels of legitimacy and popular support has been subject to only limited study”) Id. at 51. But the key is to transcend the focus on
procedure and structure, and focus more on the entire social process that impacts constitutional creation. That is why I’ve added other important
normative features like the democratic, public, popular and socially transcendental nature of the framing process. It is from the combined effect of
these factors, including participation, that we can identify the resulting normative force and legitimizing effect.
94
See Blount et al., supra note 24, 50-53. See also Arato, supra note 22, at 192 (“[N]on-democratic procedures of constitution making
cannot be justified today”).
95
See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 41 (“When writing a constitution, the people tend to be more involved, engaged, interested,
attentive, and vigilant”).
96
Lau, supra note 9, at 24-25, 45.
97
See id. at 19, 45.
98
See id. at 18.
85
86
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Illegitimate Entrenchment

As we previewed when discussing the distinction between constitutional politics and ordinary
politics, a key factor when analyzing the formal adoption of a constitutionand its direct impact on
endurance and possible future modificationis whether the constitution that was created accurately reflects
the popular will and the policy preferences of the social majority.99 While I believe process will be the main
factor as to legitimacy and authority at the creation stage, substance will also be critical for two reasons.
First, because it will either confirm or weaken the legitimacy and authority generated by the creation
process, and second, because it will determine the level of connection and fidelity required for the
constitution to endure in time.
As such, it is imperative that the democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially
transcendental process of constitutional creationwhich by itself generates considerable normative
forcealso manages to produce a constitution that actually reflects the deep-seeded views of the social
majority.100 In other words, the actual content of the constitution can be described as the direct result of the
exercise of constitutional politics by a self-governing People.101 This will be key for the endurance stage.
There is always a risk that a constitution will adopt the policy preferences of a temporary majority
that just happened to control the framing body,102 instead of the widely-held views of the social majority
that will survive passing political fluctuations.103 When this occurs, the process may still be considered
legitimate, but not necessarily its substantive outcome.104 As John Elster suggests, “[i]n a constituent
assembly, a small partisan majority may be able to impose its preferences not only on the current majority,
but also on a posterity in which it may itself be in a minority.”105
But this risk is inherent to any constitutional creation process.106 I strongly believe that this risk is
considerably minimized when the constitution was generated as the result of a democratic, public,
participatory, public, and socially transcendental process of creation. This is so, because this is the type of
process that is more likely to reflect the substantive policy preferences of the majority.107 As we will see
shortly, this is crucial as to the issue of constitutional endurance.108
A.

Endurance

1.

Introduction

This section asks two important questions: (1) should constitutions endure; and (2) why they endure.
I will also analyze how different types of constitutions interact with the overall issue of endurance and
longevity. From a purely empirical point of view, “most constitutions die young.”109 But before analyzing

Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 374-75. See also Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 15, 38.
See generally Elkins et al., supra note 35. (“[R]emarkably little empirical evidence of the impact of participation on outcomes.”). Yet
it is not hard to envision that when the People directly participate in the constitutional creation process, it will result in a constitution that
faithfully reflects the substantive policy views of the social majority. Historically, this has resulted in the creation of progressive constitutions that
reflect the views of the People and not the elites.
101
See id. at 381.
102
See DIANA KAPISZEWSKI, GORDON SILVERSTEIN & ROBERT KAGAN, INTRODUCTION TO CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert Kagan eds., 2013).
103
See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 38-39.
104
See John Elster, Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra
note 56, at 15, 18.
105
See id. at 18. See also Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40 (“When a dying political movement entrenches its program in a
constitution, there is a democratic deficit that must be addressed”).
106
See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 47.
107
See id. at 45.
108
See infra p. 26.
109
Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 1.
99

100
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the more normative questions, which require an application of the normative factors discussed in part II,
we should first explain what we mean by constitutional endurance.
Endurance means operational longevity; in other words, if the original constitution has stood the
test of time and still functions as the supreme source of law.110 For his part, Richard Albert proposes an
important distinction between constitutional resilience and endurance.111 While endurance relates to the
formal continuity of the constitutional text, resilience, defined by the author as “endurance plus,” refers to
the uninterrupted normative operation of that text.112 Both concepts are within the scope of this analysis.
2.


Should Constitutions Endure?

There is no one-size-fits-all answer to the normative question of whether constitutional endurance
is a good thing.113 The general answer seems to be: it depends.114 It would seem self-defeating to adopt a
constitution that will have the same shelf-life of ordinary legislation. As Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton
suggest, “[w]e assume that constitutions are bargains among elites that are meantat least by their
authorsto be enduring.”115
While others have identified common empirical elements shared by constitutions that have
achieved longevity,116 I propose that the main source to locate an answer lies in factors such as legitimacy
and authority, as well as connection and fidelity. In particular, I believe that when a constitutional creation
process enjoys legitimacy and authority, and when the resulting content maintains a connection with future
generations, thus commanding its fidelity, then constitutional endurance should be sought.
But there are more general reasons why some sort of substantial constitutional longevity can be
characterized as positive.117 According to Ozan Varol, these include issues like: (1) promoting stability; (2)
avoiding negative changes; and (3) facilitating social consensus.118 In that sense, constitutional endurance
“is not necessarily undesirable from a normative perspective.”119 For their part, Elkins, Ginsburg, and
Melton suggest that constitutional longevity can encourage democratic participation, economic
development, national unity, and political stability.120
As we can see, stability is a recurring theme. And as a general rule, it seems correct, but with an
important caveat: that the constitution still commands legitimacy, authority, connection, and fidelity.121 In
that sense, the key normative issue is context-specific: does the original constitutional consensus still hold?
This refers to both the question of legitimacy and authority as to process, as well as connection and fidelity
as to substantive content.122 Stability becomes undemocratic and counter-revolutionary when the present


See generally id. at 5-6.
Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 80 (2018) [hereinafter Constitutional
Amendment].
112
See id.
113
See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 7.
114
See id. at 7, 208. See also Varol, supra note 20,, at 906-07; TOM GINSBURG, Constitutional Endurance, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112, 112-13 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
115
Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 7.
116
See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 8. According to the authors, among these empirical traits are inclusiveness, flexibility, and
specificity.
117
See Varol, supra note 20, at 907.
118
See id.
119
See id.; see also Ku, supra note 16, at 538 (stating that constitutional change should be rare).
120
Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 5; see also Ginsburg, supra note 114, at 113 (discussing the positive aspects of stability).
121
See discussion supra Subsections II.B-C; see also Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 75 (stating there can be concerns of legitimacy and
therefore the endurance of a constitution when “conditions change.”); Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 211 (discussing how connection helps to
integrate “new social forces,” thereby increasing the endurance of a constitution).
122
In fact, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton hint at this combination by identifying content and drafting process as factors that go into
constitutional design. I go further and propose that the drafting process, by way of legitimacy and authority, and content, by way of connection
and fidelity, will play a critical role on terms of a constitution’s endurance.
110
111
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society no longer feels bound by the constitution.123 Stability should only be an overriding factor when there
is doubt as to whether the original social consensus still holds.124
If the original social consensus still holds, then endurance should be encouraged and characterized
as positive from a normative standpoint.125 If the consensus has broken, then the constitution should not
endure, and its longevity should be characterized negatively.126 Here, stability does not justify constitutional
endurance. As we will see, this social consensus in terms of endurance is inherently linked with the process
of creation, and if the constitution that was originally adopted still reflects the basic or overarching views
and preferences of the social majority.127
As previewed, if the element of connection and fidelity fades or weakens, then the stronger the
sense of legitimacy and authority the process must be; and vice versa.128 Eventually, the need for substantive
connection will prevail, triggering the need for constitutional change.129 On the other hand, if the
constitutional structure manages to create or enhance the social consensus behind it, constitutional
endurance will be beneficial and should be encouraged as a normative matter.
3.

Why Constitutions Endure?

This brings us to the next issue: why do constitutions endure? As previewed, I believe constitutions
endure when the current society views the original process as legitimate and authoritative,130 and the current
society shares enough agreement with the constitution’s substantive content to produce social connection
and fidelity. As we saw, this social connection and fidelity exists when the constitution’s substantive content
still adequately reflects the popular will and the policy preferences of the social majority, or there is, at
least, a critical level of it.131
If one of these two sets of factors are eroded or weakened, there must be a corresponding
strengthening of the other. Between these two sets, I believe the deciding factor will be connection and
fidelity,132 because eventually the current social majority will want the constitution to reflect its own policy
preferences, independent of their acceptance of the validity of the constitution’s creation. In that sense, I
agree with Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton when they state that “[a] constitution will be maintained only if it
makes sense to those who live under its dictates, so a crucial quality of any successful constitution is that it
be self-enforcing.”133
For example, if the current society has begun to drift away from the substantive content of the
constitution, there must be a stronger sense of legitimacy and authority in terms of process of creation. In
this instance, the current society, while disagreeing with some or even most of the policy content of the

123
See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 38, 40. See also Elster, supra note 104 (implying that the partiality of a constitution created by a
minority is “tyrannical”).
124
See generally infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
125
Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40 (“[S]ometimes the real defeat of democracy is actually the frustration of the popular will
reflected in the constitutional text, as long as that popular will, of course, holds.”).
126
See id. at 38-39.
127
See infra notes 130-31, 133 and accompanying text and pp. 30, 33.
128
See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
129
See infra notes 130-31, 133 and accompanying text.
130
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 15-16 (“public involvement in constitutional adoption…was positively correlated with constitutional
life span, at least for democracies”); Kay, supra note 92, at 715 (“Long-term acceptance of a constitution requires a continuing regard for the
process that brought into being”).
131
Ku, supra note 16, at 539 (stating that the continued legitimacy of a constitution will depend on whether it still represents the will of
the People as a whole).
132
See Blount et al., supra note 24, 52 (“Legitimacy is conditional on factors other than process”). But this requires two caveats. First,
that as to the stage of constitutional creation, process is the main source of legitimacy. Second, that it is during the endurance stage that process
begins to lose some of its normative force, thus requiring the additional normative weight provided by substantive connection and fidelity.
133
See Elkins et al., supra note 35. See also, Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 43 (“In the end, constitutions are as strong as the social
consensus behind them”); Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Looking for the Correct Tool for the Job: Methodological Models of Constitutional
Interpretation and Adjudication, 52 REV. JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE P.R. 213, 218-19 (2018) (“The success of a constitution
rests on constituted popular acceptance, if not of each and every word contained in the document itself, of the constitutional project itself)
(Emphasis in original); Ginsburg, supra note 114, 116 (“Constitutions must…be self-enforcing” through a democratic system of citizen selfgovernment).
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constitution, will still recognize it as valid because of the sheer legitimizing force generated by its process
of creation. On the other hand, if the current society starts questioning the legitimacy and authority of the
original process of creation, a stronger substantive connection to its content will be needed to ensure
endurance.
In that sense, constitutional endurance “is neither inevitable nor irreversible.”134 It depends. Instead
of looking for context-free universal answers, the desirability of constitutional longevity lies in the
normative factors we’ve analyzed in this article.135 In that sense, “[w]hile constitutions no doubt require
continuous reenactment through ongoing practices, they also involve self-conscious institutional choices
that can become quite sticky once adopted.”136
As such, there is a critical link between legitimacy and authority on the one hand and connection
and fidelity on the other. This link, while not causal, can be re-enforcing: a legitimate and authoritative
constitution can actually condition society into accepting its substantive content, thus generating the crucial
connection and fidelity necessary for constitutional longevity.137 On the other hand, a transcendental break
with the current constitutional order can actually lead the People to conclude, retroactively, that the original
creation process can now be seen as lacking legitimacy and authority.138
4.

Endurance and Constitutional Types

Revolutionary processes of constitutional creation tend to generate constitutions full of
revolutionary substantive content.139 Many of these constitutions can be characterized as teleological and
post-liberal.140 As it relates to the issue of endurance, these types of constitutions face an interesting
challenge. If they accurately reflect the deeply-held policy preferences of the social majority, and that
consensus remains substantially unaltered, then the constitution has a greater chance of surviving the
passage of time.141 This can create a self-reinforcing cycle of the constitution as the reflection of the policy
preferences of the social majority and as the generator of those preferences.142
But, unlike the more “neutral framework” constitutions that mostly deal with setting up the
structures of governments and the basic liberal procedural rights that make them work,143 these
constitutions, precisely because they take a position as to substantive public policy positions, are
permanently at risk of polarization.144 In other words, there will always be sections of the population that
strongly disagree with some of those entrenched policy positions and will see the constitution as an obstacle
to their world view.145 If the social majority or their preferences weaken, then the social support for the
constitution is bound to erode as well. When this happens, the continued endurance of the constitution
becomes an open question.146 But framework constitutions, because they do not take these positions, can
just as easily work for the benefit of opposing policy views, so neither side may be eager to replace it, thus
allowing for greater endurance.147


Varol, supra note 20, at 907.
See supra Section II.
136
Blount et al., supra note 24, at 10.
137
See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 80.
138
See Lau, supra note 9 at 248-49; see also Unconstitutional Constitutions, supra note 44, at 171.
139
See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 34-35, 40.
140
See id. at 35.
141
See id. at 34.
142
See id. at 35, 37.
143
See id. at 37.
144
See Elster, supra note 104, at 18.
145
Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 656 (2008).
146
Cf. Farinacci-Fernós, Post-Liberal Constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 40, 43 (evaluating whether, when the majority or its policy
preference changes, a substantive constitution will break).
147
See id. at 28-29.
134
135
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All constitutional systems deal with the dead hand problem149: “No interpretive method avoids the
dead hand issue because no reputable method disregards constitutional text.”150 This is inherently linked to
the issue of what Professor Lee Strang calls “challenge of change.”151 The problem of change is inevitable.152
As I previewed, I believe that connection and fidelity will be the overriding factors in terms of when and
how a constitution is changed, whether partially or completely.153 How a constitution is changed will also
depend on the legitimacy and authority of the process used to accomplish that change.154
When a constitution reflects the current views of societymeaning that the original constitutional
project is still valid and adhered to for the most part155the constitution becomes a majoritarian instrument
that allows the people to defend themselves against the malfunctions of ordinary politics.156 As such, “the
dead cannot literally govern our choices . . . . The living bear responsibility for continuing or discarding old
arrangements.”157 In the end, it is still up to us. As Adam Samaha explains, “a law may properly extend
across generations if the current generation retains the power to repeal [it].”158 The question we will address
shortly is how that repeal power can and should be exercised.
Alternatively, when the social consensus breaks and majoritarian policy preferences shift
decisively, the constitution can become an obstacle to democratic self-rule, since it entrenches policy
preferences that are no longer held by the social majority.159 This takes us back to the issue of illegitimate
entrenchment. In this instance, while the original act of entrenchment was legitimate at that time, a change
in the policy preferences of the social majority breaks the necessary connection and fidelity needed to
maintain the original constitutional project and its content.160
The greater the legitimacy and authority generated by the original constitutional creation process,
the greater the loss of connection and fidelity must be in order to conclude that the original constitution
must be substantially changed.161 In the end, no matter how legitimate and authoritative the original process
was, eventually, the overriding factor will be connection and fidelity162. However, the new exercise of
constitutional politics will determine the form of the necessary change: replacement of interpretive method,
discrete amendment, substantial overhaul, outright replacement, or a combination of two or more of these
methods.163

Some, though by no means all or even most, of the issues discussed in this section are based on a chapter of the author’s S.J.D.
Dissertation Original Explication and Post-Liberal Constitutionalism: The Role of Intent and History in the Judicial Enforcement of Teleological
Constitutions (Georgetown University Law Center, 2017).
149
See Samaha, supra note 145, at 609 (“[F]ollowing an ancient constitution amounts to dead generations governing the living.”).
150
Id. at 615-16.
151
Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Based Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which
Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 927, 928 (2009). For an ‘originalist’ approach to legal
change, see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015). Professor Sachs
recognizes that “[i]n any real-world legal system, the law is a product of both authorized and unauthorized changes.” Id. at 843. He tends to
identify formal amendment and other legally sanctioned procedures as modes of authorized change.
152
See James A. Gardner, Practice-Driven Changes to Constitutional Structures of Governance, 69 ARK. L. REV. 335, 337-38 (2016).
153
See supra p. 2.
154
See generally infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
155
See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1998); Strang,
supra note 151, at 932.
156
Ackerman, supra note 33.
157
Samaha, supra note 145, at 622; Accord Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1051.
158
Samaha, supra note 145, at 620.
159
See generally Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1014-15, 1047.
160
See Elster, supra note 104, at 18.
161
See Ku, supra note 16, at 538 (arguing that constitutional change should be by “supermajority”); See also Samaha, supra note 145, at
651 (stating that maintaining a constitution is a moral, or a connection and fidelity, issue as opposed to an issue of authority, or legitimacy and
authority).
162
See Samaha, supra note 145, at 659.
163
See Gardner, supra note 152, at 346-47; See also Constitutional Amendment, supra note 111, at 3-5, 8.
148
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Change comes in many shapes and sizes. Not every update constitutes change in the constitutional
system.164 An obvious method of change is amendment or replacement.165 Depending on the procedural and
structural aspects of a particular constitutional system, this can be a difficult or relatively easy process.166 It
would seem that the stronger the social movement to replace the constitution is, the easier it will be. As
such, constitutional change is possible only when there is a significant shift in constitutional politics.167 This
serves as a middle point between an unmovable dead hand and the instability of ordinary politics which is
premised upon temporary majorities. Constitutional change requires more than just a temporary majority;
change should be available but should not be so easy.168 Shifts in constitutional policy preferences must be
decisive in order to replace the prior consensus.169
Except for important issues of stability and institutional maturity, constitutional change is not
inherently bad or something that should be avoided as a general rule. Social majorities evolve and policy
preferences change.170 Once an issue, set of issues, or an over-arching political goal transcends ordinary
politics and becomes the focus of constitutional politics, constitutional replacement or amendment is
appropriate.171
But straight-out constitutional replacement is the weapon of last resort in the arena of constitutional
change. There are other, less formal, avenues for change.172 And here is where it gets tricky. After all, the
point of clearly written and carefully drafted constitutions that serve as higher law is to provide certainty
and allow a people to self-govern without powerful minority forces sabotaging those efforts by way of
informal devices such as under-enforcement.173 It is also meant to constrain courts in terms of substituting
democratic preferences with their own.174 Yet, any model of constitutional adjudication must address the
issue of change outside formal amendment.175 Constitutional politics force that approach.176 It can’t be an
all-or-nothing scenario. Decontextualized rigidity should be avoided; there is still a central role for politics
to play, but it should be constitutional instead of ordinary.
There are four important avenues for change: (1) informal and extralegal change in interpretive
methodology; (2) formal and legal amendment; (3) formal and legal overhaul; and (4) formal replacement,
which can be legal, extralegal, or even illegal.177 Each tool should be considered in this order, depending
on the strength of the remaining social consensus. Less drastic methods of change should be used, unless a
momentous shift has occurred, as with the exercise of constitutional politics or the presence of a
constitutional moment.
A combination of all of these can also occur. For example, an informal and extralegal change in
interpretive methodology can be accompanied by formal and legal discrete amendments that remove the
greatest textual obstacles and allow the courts to implement the new interpretive models.178 The Portuguese
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experience of the 1970s and 1980s is the perfect example for this type of combined exercise of constitutional
politics.179
2.

Constitutional Moments and new exercises of Constitutional Politics

Constitutional politics can be exercised legally, extralegally, or even illegally.180 Of course, the
closer it comes to extralegal or illegal actions, the stronger the exercise of constitutional politics must be.181
A revolutionary and democratic process can generate the normative force to overcome this lack of
legality.182 As we saw when analyzing constitutional creation, this normative force will create a new legality
that will allow the subsequent structures to be accepted as valid by the political community.183
This takes us to professor Ackerman’s proposal of constitutional moments.184 These constitutional
moments are mostly extralegal, since they do not engage the legally available formal devices of
constitutional amendment but are not directly illegal.185 These constitutional moments are the result of the
extralegal exercise of constitutional politics by the social majority.186 The main consequence of these
constitutional moments is a change in the interpretive methodology used by courts to apply the
constitutional text.187
3.

Tools of Constitutional Change

i.

Changes in Interpretative Methodologies

The least disruptive avenue of bringing about constitutional change is through the adoption of a
new method of interpretation.188 In other words, the constitution does not formally change as with an
amendment, overhaul, or replacement.189 The main result will be a new approach to constitutional
construction in terms of the normative and legal effects of the text.190 This alternative is informal and can
be mostly characterized as extralegal.191
The decision to adopt a particular methodological model of interpretation in the first place is
directly related mostly to the issue of legitimacy and authority, particularly right after the process of
creation. The decision to maintain that model is a combination of legitimacy and authority as to process on
the one hand, and connection and fidelity as to substance and content on the other.192
The same logic applies to the decision to abandon a particular method of interpretation and to adopt
a new one. As Adam Samaha explains, “the best interpretive method might well vary over time.”193 This
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happens when there is a significant shift in constitutional politics short of formal amendment or
replacement.194 Thus, when the original social consensus that (1) gave legitimacy and authority to the
constitutional project because of its process of creation and (2) was supported by continued connection and
fidelity as to the content of the constitution itself erodes or partially breaks, there are grounds for switching
interpretive methodologies.195
A change in interpretive methodology represents a shift in constitutional allegiance.196 When that
happens, the link between text (and its accompanying history and explication) and legal effect and doctrine
is weakened, precisely because the constitutional project has weakened.197 If the constitutional project is
finally broken or abandoned, then formal amendment, overhaul or replacement ensues.198 As such, the level
of continued allegiance and fidelity to the original constitutional project, or lack thereof, will determine the
type of method of interpretation used by courts and, in particular, the authoritativeness of the framers.199
For example, a loss of connection and fidelity with the original constitutional project will most likely result
in the abandonment of methods of interpretation that privilege adoption history and intent. The Chilean
experience of the 1980s and 1990s is a good example of this dynamic.200
However, sometimes courts resist changing their interpretive methodologies.201 Also, there are
situations in which even a change in interpretive approach will not be sufficient to accommodate the new
constitutional situation.202 When this happens, more formal and direct tools of constitutional change may
be needed, such as amendment or overhaul.
ii.

Amendment

By definition, amendments are necessarily formal and legal.203 The end-result is the subtraction,
modification, or addition of text to the formal constitution.204 Amendments can remove problematic or
anachronistic provisions that no longer carry sufficient popular support.205 They can also add new policy
provisions that can impact the entire constitutional project.206 The adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth ,
and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution after the Civil War are an example of this type of
paradigm-shifting constitutional amendment.207 The characterization of that process as a constitutional
moment strengthens the normative impact of the Amendments to the overarching content of the
constitution.208


Id. at 668–69.
See Strauss, supra note 171, at 1461.
196
See Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2010) (“[A]uthentic
constitutional reasoning can include consideration of strongly held public opinions as one of its constituent parts, so long as ‘strongly held public
opinion’ means something approaching consensus rather than simply the views of the majority.”).
197
See Bernal, supra note 10, at 494–95; Kay, supra note 92, at 757.
198
See Kay, supra 92, at 728 (For example, the constitutional project of the Articles of Confederation was broken or abandoned, resulting
in its replacement.).
199
See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1015 (“[W]e must transcend the Framer’s vision if we are to make our Constitution fit the needs of a
modern democratic society. [There is an] urgent need for heroic reconceptualization of the Constitution in general, the Supreme Court in
particular. [T]he task for constitutional law is to define a role for the Supreme Court . . . .”).
200
See generally Druscilla L. Scribner Distributing Political Power: The Constitutional Tribunal in Post-Authoritarian Chile, in
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds. Cambridge University Press 2013).
201
Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 56, at
195 (“Changing social circumstances and understandings will often make specific constitutional modes outmoded, yet in most countries, courts
do not respond to this by changing their interpretation of such rules.”).
202
See Cain & Noll, supra note 188, at 1518.
203
Dixon & Holden, supra note 201, at 195.
204
See Constitutional Amendment, supra note 111, at 11; Strauss, supra note 171, at 1458 (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 428 (1956)).
205
See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40.
206
See Strauss, supra note 171, at 1460.
207
Dixon, supra note 201, at 97.
208
See id. at 98.
194
195




https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol25/iss1/2


18

: The Constitution Is Dead

Spring 2020

The Constitution Is Dead

53

As Rosalind Dixon explains, “[f]ormal provision for constitutional amendment is now a near
universal feature of national constitutions.”209 One reason for this is constitutional self-preservation.210 In
other words, the constitution includes a pressure release valve that allows the community to make
alterations to the document as opposed to throwing it away when there has been a shift in constitutional
preferences.211 In these circumstances, the constitution entices the community to consider discrete change
to radical substitution.212
iii.

Overhaul

While technically done through the amendment process, constitutional overhaul requires separate
analysis.213 While amendments can be discrete and limited, constitutional overhaul tends to be much more
substantial and comprehensive.214 In this context, amendments are overarching and multiple.215 When the
process is complete, the constitution may be somewhat unrecognizable, but its basic core and essence are
still intact. Many overhauls can combine legal, extralegal, illegal, formal, and informal mechanisms and
elements.216
Of course, some overhauls are so wide-ranging that they become the functional equivalent of
replacement.217 Full-scale revisions are an example of this phenomenon.218 Yet the overhaul should not be
discarded as an alternative to outright replacement, particularly when the reason for avoiding replacement
is to preserve some of the legitimacy and authority of the original constitutional project. As such,
constitutional overhaul recognizes that the existing constitutional order has weakened considerably but still
possesses enough redeeming qualities.219 An example of this can be that the new political community lacks
sufficient connection and fidelity to the old constitutional order, but still accepts its legitimacy and authority
and wishes to maintain or build on it.
This difficult balance between amendment and replacement leaves room for constitutional overhaul
to be either legal or, on the contrary, extralegal or even illegal.220 The closer the overhaul is to discrete
amendment, the more likely the process will be carried out through existing legal processes, structures, and
channels.221 On the other hand, the closer the overhaul is to outright replacement, the more likely that
extralegal or illegal processes, structures, and channels will be deployed.222 The same thing applies as to
the formal-informal dichotomy.
iv.

Replacement
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Unlike amendment and overhaul, replacement constitutes a displacement of the previous
constitution.223 While the new one may replicate some of the content of its antecessor and offer other
avenues of continuity, as a conceptual matter, the new constitution is wholly independent of the previous
one.224 As a result, the previous constitution loses all of its independent normative power. It can only live
on as a supplementary guide to interpret the new constitution in situations where the latter emulated or
copied the former.225
In that sense, “the distinction between an amendment and replacement is important.”226 Also, while
amendments are necessarily adopted through existing legal processes, structures, and channels,
constitutional replacement can be legal, extralegal, or illegal.227 If it is done through processes, structures,
or channels that are extralegal or illegal, the move to replace the constitution must satisfy the normative
elements we discussed earlier when analyzing the creation stage.228 In other words, it must be a real exercise
of constitutional politics that generates its own legitimacy and authority, so that the replacement action is
seen as valid, even if contrary to the previous legality.
As a result, replacement brings the stages of constitutional existence full circle. If constitutional
creation constitutes one constitution’s end is another’s beginning, then constitutional replacement means
that one constitution’s beginning is another’s end. When this happens, the stages of constitutional existence
starts once again, and the new constitution must attempt to survive its birth, endure over time, and resist
future replacement challenges.229
C.

Connection between Stages

There is no inherent link between a constitution’s creation, its endurance, and its eventual
modifications, including replacement.230 Constitutions that were the result of a highly democratic and
popular process of creation that generated a substantial level of legitimacy and authority, sometimes fail to
produce sufficient connection and fidelity with future generations so as to survive unscathed.231 Portugal is
an example of this.232 On the other hand, constitutions that were adopted by elites through less than
democratic means manage to endure because they manage to receive acceptance by the population.233 The
United States is a partial example of this.234
But, there is a connection between the normative factors that are present in each stage.235 For
example, a constitution that was adopted by a highly democratic, public, popular, participatory, and socially
transcendental process of creation will generate considerable legitimacy and authority that will carry it on
to the endurance stage.236 Now, in order for this constitution to fail at the endurance stage, there must be a
significant gap between its substantive content and the views of the community.237 In other words, in order
to defeat a constitution that carries such a high level of legitimacy and authority, an equally substantial lack
of connection and fidelity is required to negate the normative force of that legitimacy and authority and
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condemn the constitution to a short life. At the same time, a constitution that lacks a considerable initial
level of legitimacy and authority will need substantial connection and fidelity to survive the next phases
that follow creation.
As such, we can conclude that the stronger the level of legitimacy and authority
generated by the process of creation, the higher the chances of endurance (and thus the lower the chances
of early modification or replacement), unless the constitutional project fails to generate sufficient
substantive connection and fidelity or there is a new exercise of constitutional politics of equal legitimacy
and authority that displaces the original project. Also, the weaker the level of legitimacy and authority
generated by the creation, the lower the chances of endurance (and thus the higher the chances of early
modification or replacement), unless the constitutional project is able to generate sufficient substantive
connection and fidelity and there is no new exercise of constitutional politics that displaces it.
In summary: (1) legitimacy and authority will be crucial during creation; (2) both legitimacy and
authority, on the one hand, and connection and fidelity, on the other, will interact as they relate to endurance;
and (3) connection and fidelity will be the determining factors as to the issue of change.238 In the end,
legitimacy and authority only take you so far, generating initial acceptance. As time goes by, the continued
acceptance of the constitutional project will depend more and more on connection and fidelity. As a result,
there is a sliding scale between authority and legitimacy on one side, and connection and fidelity on the
other.239
IV.
FINAL THOUGHTS

The model of constitutional stages discussed in this article has both general application to all
constitutions and particular application to revolutionary constitutions. This revolutionary characterization
mostly relates to both the process of creation and the substantive content of the constitution itself.
Revolutionary constitutions face particular challenges as to their creation, endurance, and
modifications.240 The revolutionary character of the constitutional project will, in turn, interact with the
different normative features we discussed earlier, such as legality, legitimacy, fidelity, and formality,
among others. As such, the success of any revolutionary constitutional project will depend on the presence
of these normative elements during all stages of constitutional existence. As we have seen, (1) the
legitimacy and authoritative status of the creation process, and (2) the continued level of connection and
fidelity between future generations and the original constitutional project will determine how revolutionary
constitutions are created, why they are able to endure, and how they interact with the different possibilities
relating to change. As a result, revolutionary constitutions represent one of the most intense exercises of
constitutional politics.
The success of a revolutionary constitution will depend, in the end, on a continued exercise of
constitutional politics, spread out in time and through different generations. More importantly, it will
depend on how the revolutionary constitution is created and whether it has been able to actually transform
society, thus maintaining the all-important connection. A truly successful revolutionary constitution will
not only endure; it will directly aid a self-governing People in the process of radically transforming society.
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